This article analyses attempts to write the 'herstory' of feminism, and the tendency to use the vocabulary of 'generation' (in particular Julia Kristeva, Toril Moi, Kelly Oliver and Lisa Walsh). It concludes that the issues raised by 'earlier generations' are still alive, and that important questions that now seem to be given greater prominence such as 'intersex' or cultural difference do not necessarily involve any methodological shift. Examples (including recent publications) are drawn mostly from the work of Kristeva and Luce Irigaray, with some reference to Miche`le Le Doeuff.
Preliminary remarks
There are three things at stake throughout the debates over the contested territory of 'French feminism'. 1 1. Our (feminists') desire for a history -not just a petit re´cit, a story (although the pleasure in narrative should not be discounted), but a 'grown-up' place in the grand re´cit world History. 2 2. The comfort that we derive from labelling, from giving names, cataloguing temporal, geographical or conceptual tendencies. This ordering helps us to 'make sense' just as narrative does, and histories can incorporate genealogies. 3 . The fact that analysis at any moment has to operate on a particular level of generality or specificity -and the way in which this always foments debate over exclusion and inclusion.
Toril Moi's Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory 3 (1985) set up an opposition between Anglo-American liberal humanist or constructionist takes on gender and French psychoanalytic ones. 4 While Moi's path-breaking work should be acknowledged, that opposition has been critiqued as oversimplistic. Yet it still has some validity. Today, one of the most striking features of the anglophone critical scene is the way in which race and sexuality (including a focus on intersex and transgender issues) have overtaken gender (and class) as the angle of choice for those whose analysis of texts has a political edge. Meanwhile French literary criticism within France remains predominantly stubbornly apolitical although there are honourable exceptions. The institution weighs heavy. Postcolonial analysis is much less powerful than in the anglophone world -although Derrida's recent work on hospitality, for example, has had an immediate impact outside France at least in part because it has a purchase on postcolonial issues. 5 Feminist criticism as such has a low profile in France todayneither Cixous nor Kristeva (two of the original trinity of 'French feminists') are working purely in this area. Irigaray and Le Doeuff seem lonely voices even if they are not quite alone. Queer theory and men's studies have hardly taken off in France. This article will therefore ask what French feminist theory (coming out of a particular national context) offers to us in the UK today when we want to analyse gender (alongside 'race' and 'class') -and will suggest two key elements (a return to motherhood and a concern with the sexuation of language), as well as both reaffirming and problematizing the necessity to locate positions or ideas within notions of historical progress or national identity. 6 2. Generations: history or structure? Equality and difference We have a desire for history, for historical progress that we can map. It is harder to be satisfied with an atemporal and abstract structure. One of Julia Kristeva's most influential and most-quoted writings for feminists is the translation of the article 'Le Temps des femmes', published in 1981 in Signs as 'Women's Time'.
7 I shall take two of the many summaries of (French) feminist theory that used her article to provide a springboard, a chronology or even a map for their narratives about feminism: Toril Moi's influential 1985 introduction to feminist literary theory, and an edited collection published almost twenty years later entitled Contemporary French Feminism (2004).
Moi follows Kristeva in suggesting an Hegelian tri-partite structure to the history of feminism: first equality or liberal feminism (such as Le Deuxie`me Sexe); then radical or difference feminism (such as Cixous and Irigaray we 4 I am using constructionist in a weak sense here including, for example, those who simply emphasize the constructed nature of gender as opposed to sex. 5 The importance of Edward Said's work has only rather belatedly been recognized in France. 6 Those of us in French Studies in the UK are pulled between France and the powerful anglophone world, and need to keep negotiating between the two. This could be an awkward marginalized position, but equally the margin can offer a powerfully hybrid view.
7 34/44: Cahiers de recherche de sciences des textes et documents 5 (Winter 1979), 5 -19. Translated by Alice Jardine and Harry Blake in Signs 7:11 (Autumn 1981), 13 -35. might imagine); and third Kristeva's own position, summarized by Moi as: 'Women reject the dichotomy between masculine and feminine as metaphysical' (Sexual/Textual Politics, p. 12). Lisa Walsh, in the Introduction to Contemporary French Feminism which she has co-edited with Kelly Oliver also repeats this suggested structure (equality followed by difference) -and tentatively proposes that the volume presents to us this Kristevan third wave. 8 Her Introduction is entitled 'The Swell of the Third Wave', a title which indicates that tentative note (merely a 'swell') even as it reaffirms the existence of a third wave. The Introduction does not lay out the rationale for the choice of contributors whom Walsh calls 'a generational third wave' (p. 7, my emphases in bold throughout) although many of them are in or near their seventiesindeed she acknowledges that they 'are still struggling with some of the same issues as their forebears of the first and second waves' (p. 9). We might note the biologistic, genealogical tone -perhaps 'inherited' from the Kristevan intertext or perhaps typical of this kind of survey. She sums up the issues addressed in the volume as 'difference, singularity and universality' (p. 7). These are indeed key issues for feminism, but have such general import that, one might suggest, unless they are given a specific gloss they could be located in work produced in almost any place or period.
If we return to 'Le Temps des femmes' -which, like much of Kristeva's work, is more difficult than many summaries would suggest -we find that, at the beginning of the article, Kristeva in fact discusses the historical transformation of the nation state as a result of, she suggests, the 1929 crash and the Second World War. She argues that the previously self-sufficient and homogeneous state (or, at least, the chimera of such homogeneity) has become economically interdependent with other states if not dependent on one or more of them -the phenomenon usually referred to as globalization. She claims that, although this economic globalization entails the collapse of social and philosophical coherence for the nation, historical tradition and linguistic unity are 'recast' as a symbolic denominator glossed as 'la me´moire culturelle et religieuse forge´e par une histoire et une ge´ographie intrique´es' (p. 5). The nation (say, France) shares much of this with an entire continent (say, Europe) but still accentuates its traits in the strange temporality of the future perfect (we shall have been) by which the most repressed past returns in the most modern. However, this national identity, which relates not so much to material production but to biological and symbolic reproduction, reveals a number of supranational characteristics -and hence a potential loss of historical identity in anthropology. Thus, economic globalization aside, France not only becomes part of Europe on the level of biological and symbolic reproduction, but Europe has to see itself in relation to other supranational socio-cultural ensembles -relatively easy in the case of North or South America, she suggests, less so in the case of India or China where there is less of a historical link. (These examples might prompt a British person reading the article to undo some of the geographical generalisms since our colonial history might lead us to see ourselves in relation to India in certain ways far more importantly than to much of South America.) The constitution of national or European identity relates to linear time, she argues, while the loss of identity in supranational anthropological connection relates to monumental time. The category of 'European women' thus qua 'European' relate to European linear time and identity but also qua 'women' relate to monumental time and 're´percuteront, de manie`re bien entendu spe´cifique, les traits universaux qui sont ceux de leur place structurale dans la reproduction et ses repre´sentations' (p. 6). (It is important to note that 'women' enter as one example amongst others such as 'young people of Europe'. Women both are and are not a privileged example -although sometimes understood by Kristeva's readers as the only instance.) Thus Kristeva can go on to place the history of feminism: to argue that, while feminism is universalist and cosmopolitan in its demands, the first generation is more determined by a national problematic, while the second generation is more determined by its place within the 'symbolic denominator' therefore European and trans-European.
Thus far Kristeva's argument appears to relate to historical developments, and I shall return to the importance of this very briefly in my conclusion. However, we find a paragraph that glosses her definition of 'generation' just before her much-quoted account at the end of the article of the third generation, or attitude, that regards the man/woman dichotomy as metaphysical. I shall quote at length as I think it helps to explain the mystification that has arisen around the notion of generation in histories of French feminism:
Si tout ce qui pre´ce`de peut eˆtre dit -la question de savoir si c'est vrai fait partie d'un autre registre -c'est sans doute parce qu'une distance peut eˆtre de´sormais prise par rapport a`ces deux ge´ne´rations fe´minines pre´ce´dentes. Ce qui implique sans doute qu'une troisie`me est en train de prendre corps en tout cas en Europe. Je n'ai pas en vue une nouvelle classe d'aˆge (quoi que son importance n'est pas a`sous-estimer) ni un autre 'mouvement des masses fe´minines' qui prendrait la rele`ve de la seconde ge´ne´ration. Si l'on accepte notre sens de 'ge´ne´ration' qui implique en fin de compte moins une chronologie qu'un espace signifiant, un espace mental corporel et de´sirant on peut soutenir que de´sormais une troisie`me attitude est possible, une troisie`me ge´ne´ration donc, ce qui n'exclue pas -tout au contraire -que les trois existent paralle`lement dans un meˆme temps historique, ou qu'elles empie`tent meˆme l'une sur l'autre. (TF, p. 17, italics in original, bold indicates my emphasis)
Kristeva wants to define generation as an attitude, or, more technically, as a signifying space which can exist in the same historical time as other generations. The obvious question is: why use the term 'generation' -a term that clearly implies the historical and biological passing of time? While three generations -grandmothers, mothers and daughters -can exist in the same historical moment, that co-existence is merely a temporary overlapping and, statistically, barring historical traumas each succeeding generation will outlive the previous one. It is a loaded vocabulary choice and one that has clearly had an impact on commentators (perhaps because it speaks to our own psychic demands), although Kristeva seems so concerned to unpick it. 9 Moi, like many other commentators on feminist criticism after the 1960s, does not devote much analysis to equality feminism (consigned to an earlier period and to Beauvoir) 10 but indicates very clearly two distinct tendencies within stage two (difference) feminism. She names these 'Anglo-American' and 'French' and although she points out several times that these adjectives are not supposed to denote nationality or birth-place for all theorists subscribing to a given tendency, the national descriptors have a tenacity as do terms like 'generation'.
11 The Anglo-American theorists in question (principally Elaine Showalter, Ellen Moers, Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar) are seen as ahistorical, their methodology still in thrall to patriarchal literary categories beloved of New Criticism. They privilege the aesthetic as a separate category divorced from politics and/or demand from women writers realism as a reflection of women's 'authentic experience'. They seem to suggest that there is a homogeneous women's voice to be disinterred from under the layers of patriarchal myth about gender. Constructionism proper, more associated with equality feminism and with the materialist feminism that has been a powerful strand in British feminism (and with Beauvoir, Delphy and Le Doeuff in France), is less part of Moi's opposition and more part of the critique of (essentialist) difference feminism that could enhance the Kristevan third wave. Nevertheless the historical succession or structural opposition (equality or difference) remains as the most powerful and influential element -with many critics hoping somehow for a synthesis or sublation in a 'third generation'. Moi's own position appears to be that Kristeva's 'deconstruction' of identity, including sexual identity, if insufficiently materialist to be truly revolutionary, nevertheless constituted a third stage.
The question is whether there has been any fundamental change that could be characterized as a third generation, or whether the third generation is simply a useful shorthand for critics to connote a position that incorporates elements of equality and difference alongside an analytic wariness about these elements? How would we relate it to a historical shift -that could 9 Other kinds of generational models include Elaine Showalter's gynocritics in A Literature of their Own (1977). Showalter proposes three separate but overlapping phases: the 1840s-80s in which women writers imitated male models but with feminine concerns; the period up to about 1920 in which we can locate specific feminist protests and demands; the period up to the time of her writing in which women explore the inner space of female experience. Many other commentators focus their chronologies on what is perceived as a break in the late 1960s, for instance Catherine Belsey and Jane Moore in their introduction to The Feminist Reader: Essays in Gender and the Politics of Literary Criticism (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, second edn 1997), p. 1. Belsey and Moore attempt to cope with the problem of making any finer distinctions between 'generations' as follows: 'the history of feminism does not chart the progression towards a moment of truth, or liberation. Certainly there have been generations of feminism but those generational spaces do not constitute a linear narrative. On the contrary, they tell of advances and retreats, triumphs and setbacks, that confuse any teleological organisation' (p. 12).
10 Moi's subsequent work stresses the continuing importance of Beauvoir; see, for example, Simone de Beauvoir: The Making of an Intellectual Woman (Oxford, Blackwell, 1994) and What is A Woman? (Oxford University Press, 1999).
11 Kristeva's use of the term 'European' splits Anglo from American -I presume.
perhaps be linked to a transformation whether in the economic base, in the mode of reproduction or in other superstructural elements? Or is any change quantitative rather than qualitative? One argument that can be made is that issues relating to race, sexuality, transgender and intersex are more predominant in current feminist writing. However, as Moi points out already in Sexual/Textual Politics, the incorporation of race, sexuality, class does not in itself imply a methodological shift. For instance, if feminists interested in critiquing 'images of women' in male (or indeed female) writers as Kate Millett or Simone de Beauvoir do, instead turn to critiquing images of lesbian or black or working-class women, there is not necessarily any questioning of methodology. It might be a politically important move, and it might produce interesting and refined analyses of literature, but it can still make the same assumptions about writing, reading and the operation of powereven though it may open up both the homogenization of 'women', focusing on the differences between us, and also the binary opposition of womanman. This opening up is necessary and yet, as I shall go on to suggest, the issue of the level of analysis is what is really at stake here. The focus on transgender and intersex is perhaps slightly different since it directly addresses the woman-man binary in some respects. However, if the materialist approach is adopted -considering the specific and crucial role of women in the reproduction of the means of production (and remembering the marxist refusal to allow exceptions to the rule to invalidate the class structure) -then it is not clear how a focus on these exceptional cases does more than raise a number of very interesting questions at the margins. On a philosophical level, the exceptional and marginal should make us question apparently watertight categories. On a sociological level even a huge array of skin tones does not prevent many individuals identifying as 'white' or 'black' in a particular socio-political context that demands it of them. The vast majority of human beings live their lives in situations where they are considered, and consider themselves, as men or women. The two extracts from Kristeva's more recent writing in the volume edited by Oliver and Walsh 12 suggest a new tri-partite pattern that is far more straightforwardly historical in moving from the struggle for the vote to the broader campaign for equal rights in all domains. However, the suggestion that comes out particularly in the English translation is that this ended with Beauvoir (since she described it), and then difference feminism begins in the late 60s. The French gives slightly more of a sense that Beauvoir wrote the manifesto for the struggle for equal rights thus we might realize that this was Troisie`me e´tape dans l'e´veil des femmes (apre`s la lutte des suffragettes de la fin du XIX e sie`cle, puis celle des militantes pour l'e´galite´avec les hommes dans tous les domaines -dont Le Deuxie`me Sexe de Simone de Beauvoir fut le manifeste), le mouvement fe´ministe, autour de Mai 68 et apre`s, insista avec une violence pathe´tique sur cette liberte´toute neuve et sur les diffe´rences impre´vues qu'elle re´velait: une autre sexualite´, un autre langage, une autre politique. Mais ce refus de la tradition n'a pas su e´viter les exce`s, le plus grave ayant consisteá`s tigmatiser la maternite´comme preuve ultime de l'exploitation des femmes par tous les patriarcats possibles et imaginables, depuis la nuit des temps. [. . .] La maternite´[. . .] s'impose de nouveau comme la plus essentielle des vocations fe´minines: de´sire´e, accepte´e et accomplie de´sormais avec le maximum des chances pour la me`re, le pe`re et l'enfant. [. . .] Nul n'ignore que, de leur osmose avec l'espe`ce, qui les diffe´rencie radicalement des hommes, les femmes he´ritent d'importantes difficulte´s a`manifester leur ge´nie: a`construire un autre don spe´cifique, e´ventuellement ge´nial, a`la culture de cette humanite´qu'elles abritent dans leurs ventres.
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In this quotation, the generation said to be first in 1981 has become second. What is intriguing here is that the position attributed to the third Kristevan generation -said to be the overcoming of the equality/difference binary and the acknowledgement that the masculine/feminine dichotomy belongs to the realm of metaphysics -has disappeared into a re-formulation of difference around maternity. Maternity is asserted as (a) critically important and valuable for humanity, (b) a key marker of sexual difference and (c) something which holds women back from achieving their potential in other domains. Are equality and difference in fact -far from being sublatedstill being worked out?
Naming places and tendencies
There is a desire to name -both 'generation', to locate temporally, and also 'place', to locate spatially (UK, USA, France, Europe. . .). Yet both these locations are slippery; in Kristeva's 'Le Temps des femmes' and in the two critical texts I have chosen that are informed by it, they slide away from the reader even as they seem to be pinned down. Yet even if the writer knows that names and descriptors do not capture everything, and that that failure might be compounded by globalization, naming returns. We must locate temporally and spatially even as we problematize location.
It can be important to be reminded of the specificity of French feminist history -usually located as emerging from dissatisfaction with the sexual politics of the class struggle (notably in 1968), although women were also involved in the anti-colonial struggle. In USA far-left politics made less of a mark on feminism -instead it was women's involvement first in the nineteenth-century anti-slavery movement 14 and then the civil rights (and to some extent anti-Vietnam) struggle that had a similar politicizing effect (as Moi points out). Beyond that it is relevant to consider French national history and culture. Some critics refer us back very usefully to the French Republican tradition with its privileging of universality via liberty, equality -and fraternity -the last term suggesting the real inequalities this all covers. This has meant that the French state, and French political culture, can be hostile to arguments based on difference -whether pertaining to sexist language ('fraternity', 'les droits de l'homme'), sexual harassment or equal opportunities monitoring with regard to sex or race. 15 This has a great impact even on what information is available since national statistics are organized in a way inimical to the recognition of cultural difference. Although statistics that differentiate between citizens on grounds of ethnicity are hard to come by, there is data on immigration that is also important in terms of the specificity of France -as opposed to the USA for instance. We might note first the patterns of immigration from other European countries -at one time from Portugal for instance, but now most strikingly from Eastern Europe. Second, it is always critical to bear colonial history in mind -not only which countries have been colonized and retain links with France (and not only because of immigration) but also the ways in which France carried out its colonization, for instance, the specificity of the French notion of a civilizing mission and the impact on the education systems imposed. This returns us to the striking adherence to universalism, and the differences and inequalities that lie buried (not so far beneath the surface!) beneath the rhetoric of 'Equality, Liberty and Fraternity'.
One key question is that of the level of specificity of any analysis -and I should lay my cards on the table immediately and say that I have argued for many years for an oscillating optic. 16 Any singular case or situation, any individual, is a point of intersection of different codes, is crossed by different texts. It is essential for work to be done on different levels of generality (including the level women) and for the micro-levels to inform the macro and vice versa. No one level alone will provide enough, and indeed levels never do operate independently. Our analysis of the most singular case is informed by more general assumptions inherent even in our vocabulary and thus the general is assumed within it, otherwise no single case is commensurate with any other; at the same time if there is no explicit recognition of the collective possibilities then there is a risk of losing any political purchase and any possibility of action or change. Analysis of gender in the broadest terms relies on our assumption of countless individual examples that have fed into the production of the analysis and will allow recognition on the part of the receiver/consumer of the analysis; 
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at the same time since nothing general holds in its entirety for any singularity there is a risk of exclusion or silencing of differences or, at worst, totalitarian annihilation.
Naming equality or difference as feminist tendencies is also not simple. If we turn to the definition of equality we find that the struggle for equal rights has often involved campaigning for abortion, contraception, refuges for battered wives, maternity leave. . . In other words rights that pertain to sexual difference rather than sameness. Even the battle for equal pay now encompasses recognition of the importance of paying attention to different profiles because of career breaks women have had. On the other hand, if we turn to the debates around difference, Elizabeth Grosz is one of the commentators on Irigaray who have most convincingly shown how her espousal of sexual difference does not relate to the sexual stereotyping (masculinity ¼ reason; femininity ¼ emotion) that opponents often assume. Grosz shows how sexual sameness encompasses opposition and complementarity as well as literal sameness; in other words it is sexual sameness (not sexual difference) that promotes the notion that masculinity is active, for example, while femininity is passive. 17 However, how can we recognize difference? One key question is that of the time of difference. Difference (even in terms of sexuate legal rights) can imply the recognition of existing difference or the promotion of difference as yet unrealized. Penelope Deutscher makes some useful parallels (via Fanon and other thinkers, and via the struggles of the aboriginal peoples of Australia) with cultural difference.
18 Fanon warns us of nostalgia in the reinvention of cultural difference suppressed by colonialism -instead a new cultural difference may yet to be invented. Deutscher seems to suggest that Irigaray is on the side of promotion of an as yet impossible difference rather than the recognition of an existing difference -but perhaps both elements are there. 19 4. Luce Irigaray: sexual and cultural difference I shall now turn briefly to the work of Luce Irigaray 20 -in part because she is silently (assumed as second wave and) excluded from the anthology Contemporary French Feminism, although she has published plenty of feminist work in the period since 1995 which appears to be the time frame of the collection. Luce Irigaray is interesting in many respects; here I shall briefly place her in the context of the debate over diversity or multiculturalism, then in the context of a renewed interrogation of motherhood as critical in demarcating sexuate difference, and finally in the context of the question of the sexuation of language.
In Okin's point, as glossed by Deutscher, is that cultures are typically patriarchal and therefore according them group rights is often bad for women. A number of thinkers, notably Le Doeuff, have pointed out the uneven (because selfinterested) application of multi-culturalism, or indeed universalism, by governments. Women's rights usually feature as screen, window-dressing, alibi or pretext. 21 Deutscher argues perhaps surprisingly that Luce Irigaray does not accept the opposition between feminists promoting equality and those promoting difference: 'she argues for the affirmation of sexual difference as an alternative basis for equality [. . .] a politics anticipating difference' (p. 1). Deutscher argues that Luce Irigaray's work enables a new understanding of multiculturalism that is not only about recognizing traditional differences but also 'respect for identities newly negotiated and contested by diverse intracultural groups' (p. 6). In other words, the same questions that Luce Irigaray makes us pose about different sexuate identities and the rights to be accorded to these -neither nostalgically located in a past time nor presently available -should be posed about cultural or ethnic identities.
It is unsurprising that, particularly in the current macrocosmic political situation, we are concerned by issues of ethnicity and migration. However, Luce Irigaray alerts us to the danger that patriarchy subsumes an apparent plurality of 'races' into a kind of uniformity; she argues that only attention to micro-and macro-cosmic sexual difference can prevent the slide into sameness that is characteristic of our mono-culture. 22 Paying due care to the real difference that is closest to us and attempting to build what she terms a 21 In 'A Little Learning: Women and (Intellectual) Work', in Contemporary French Feminisms, pp. 74-89 (first published in English in 2000), Le Doeuff points out the enthusiasm with which the notion of providing a 'little' schooling for women in developing countries is embraced -when it is claimed this will reduce the birth rate in the countries concerned. CONTINUING DEBATES ABOUT 'FRENCH' FEMINIST THEORY culture of two subjects, will, she argues, improve other kind of relations in difference, including cultural difference:
Certains facteurs historiques peuvent nous sembler plus importants que le traitement de la diffe´rence des sexes: ceux lie´s aux migrations de notre e´poque, par exemple. Or celles-ci risquent de nous entraıˆner vers une neutralisation et une fantomatisation de plus en plus inquie´tantes de l'environnement et de l'individu, s'accompagnant de tutelles autoritaires pour encadrer ou inte´grer le multiple et l'e´tranger. La dernie`re e´poque paternaliste se dit au pluriel, mais un pluriel restant souvent a`l'inte´rieur de la cloˆture du monde patriarcal. 23 
Returning to maternity
Motherhood is vitally important in analysis of gender -it is not a marginal question but materially and psychically essential. To return to Moi's guide:
The working class is potentially revolutionary because it is indispensable to the capitalist economy, not because it is marginal to it. In the same way women are central -not marginal -to the process of reproduction. It is precisely because the ruling order cannot maintain the status quo without the continued exploitation and oppression of these groups that it seeks to mask their central economic role by marginalizing them on the cultural, ideological and political levels. (p. 171)
24
My only query with respect to this helpful point would be to question whether 'in the same way' is justified. As Moi herself would point out (in her analysis of Beauvoir), the differences between women as a category and the working class are important. Luce Irigaray argues that mothers, and women in general, should not be assimilated to the natural element in humanity; motherhood is not a passive condition, but (I would say) a kind of hospitality: 'Il est plutoˆt question d'accepter librement de partager sa vie, sa chair, son souffledonc en quelque sorte son aˆme -avec l'enfant a`qui on donne naissance'. 25 Similarly, Kristeva writes of maternity: 'Il y a de la vie et elles peuvent la donner: nous pouvons la donner'. 26 She argues that giving (everyday) life, giving time, giving meaning are forms of the sacred. 27 However, note: 'Hors la maternite´, il n'existe pas, dans l' expe´rience humaine, de situations qui nous confrontent aussi radicalement a`cette e´mergence de l'autre. Le pe`re, a`sa fac¸on et moins imme´diatement, est conduit a`la meˆme alchimie: mais il doit, pour ce faire, s'identifier au parcours de l'accouchement et de la naissance, donc a`l'expe´rience maternelle, se faire lui-meˆme maternel et fe´minin; avant d'y ajouter sa propre part indispensable et radicale. J'aime a`penser que, dans notre aventure humaine, il nous est donned e rencontrer l"'autre" -parfois, rarement . . . -si, et seulement si, nous, hommes et femmes, sommes capables de cette expe´rience maternelle qui diffe`re l'e´rotisme en tendresse et fait d'un "objet" un "autre moi"' (FS, 93 -94).
6. Sexuate language: 'Do you love me?' (as women ask) or 'I wonder if I am loved/I tell myself that perhaps I am loved' (as men say) Luce Irigaray maintains that there is already sexual difference in language, and that sexual difference in language should be fostered and cultivated by teachers and others. That difference is marked in content, syntax, grammar and indeed every other linguistic and creative feature. Chi sono io? Chi sei tu? gives a large number of examples of this sexuate difference in Italian children's drawings and writings -other works give cross-cultural comparisons. 28 Luce Irigaray concludes that young boys, like adult philosophers, tend to focus on the one, or the relation (often an instrumental relation) of the one to the many; whereas girls are more interested in one to one relations. Boys, she claims, make sentences in which subjects relate to objects; and they tell of doing, or wanting to do, things to things. This is the model that is culturally dominant as she explains, for example in The Way of Love.
29 Girls tend to privilege inter-subjective relations, and the preposition with; their sentences are more likely to promote a culture of two subjects. I shall give some examples from Chi sono io? Chi sei tu? If boys are asked to make a sentence using the preposition with they are likely to make sentences such as 'I played with my computer' (a relation to an object) or 'I played football with my mates' (a relation to many, and with the term for friends in Italian, say, in the masculine). In the same situation girls produce sentences, such as 'I went for a walk with David', that involve a relation between two people -quite possibly a relation with a boy. Primary school boys' sentences are less likely to introduce sexual difference in this way, unless they are specifically asked to speak or write about a girl. In that context, a good proportion of the sentences will treat the girl as an object, seen, judged (often in a quantifying manner) and so on. When asked to imagine doing something with a girl, a few stock situations reoccur over and over again -notably, eating a pizza and going to the cinema. Against these observations and the conclusions that Luce Irigaray draws from them about the need to cultivate sexuate difference in schools, we have two positions. One maintains that there is strongly marked sexual difference in language, and that indeed no other socio-linguistic phenomenon is so strongly attested, but that this is (largely or completely) due to cultural construction and deformation. The second maintains that there is no evidence that any alleged sexual difference in language holds across a range of racial, cultural, class, generational and other contexts. I would argue that both are true. There is (statistically, or in Marxist class sense) always sexual difference and how it is played out will vary according to other cultural differences. To take an example other than those given by Luce Irigaray, Timothy Pooley claims that 'given similar social characteristics, women almost always use 28 Chi sono io? Chi sei tu? La chiave per una convivenza universale (Casalmaggiore, Biblioteca di Casalmaggiore, 1999) . Not yet translated.
29
The Way of Love, tr. by Heidi Bostic and Stephen Pluhacek (London, Continuum, 2002) . Not yet published in French.
CONTINUING DEBATES ABOUT 'FRENCH' FEMINIST THEORY variants closer to the standard prestige norm for any given variable than men'. 30 He cites Trudgill's claim that this is 'the single most consistent finding to emerge from sociolinguistic studies over the past twenty years' (p. 214). It is a relational claim, a claim relative to context. However, it is still related to cultural deformation, a general pressure on women to be nice and polite -we thus return to the points made earlier about equality/ sameness and difference.
7. Five points in conclusion As Miche`le Le Doeuff shows very powerfully, there is still enormous need for equality feminism and gender analysis. Even abortion and contraception are not legal in France, simply 'tolerated' for French citizens. 31 jamais une seule langue'.
34 Women, Luce Irigaray tells us, need to cultivate their own subjectivity. I would say we need to learn to be good hosts and good guests, as well as being alone. Perhaps it is only by taking the plural and the singular; the general, the partial and the particular; the past (or our image of it), the present and the yet to come that we shall arrive at a better understanding of difference and how it does, does not (the question of what is excluded is clearly critical) or could function. The political struggle for equalities cannot be stalled while we debate these matters -but that praxis must be continuously interrogated by our theoretical understandings of difference -and I would argue that that can be shown to have the most practical and positive effects for women and for men. 35 UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM 34 Le Monolinguisme de l'autre ou la prothe`se d'origine (Paris, Galile´e, 1996) pp. 15, 21. This is an example, as is He´le`ne Cixous's 'altobiographical' and theoretical writing, of the marking of French with Algeria and vice versa. 35 For example, the reform of the House of Commons working hours, the campaign for parity in France.
